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Anticipation and Reaction to Going Concern Modified Audit Opinions by
Sophisticated Investors
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether institutional investors: 1) anticipate a distressed
firm’s receipt of a first-time going concern modified audit opinion, and 2) react to a first-time
going concern modified opinion by engaging in abnormal net selling of firm shares. Using a
proprietary database of U.S. institutional investor trades, we find that institutional investors are
net sellers of first-time going concern opinion firms beginning six months before the release of
the report and remain net sellers through the subsequent three months. We also find that the
severity of the reasons auditors modify their opinions is associated with increased trading
activity, but only after the opinion is publicly available. Our results support the position that an
auditor’s going concern modified opinion is influential in the marketplace by documenting that
institutional investors anticipate this price-relevant information and react through increased
selling. The finding of increased net selling of firms with more severe reasons for report
modifications provides evidence of the incremental informational value of the wording in the
modified opinion.

Keywords: Going Concern, Auditor Opinions, Institutional Investors
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Anticipation and Reaction to Going Concern Modified Audit Opinions by
Sophisticated Investors
1. INTRODUCTION
In this study, we examine whether institutional investors, as a group of sophisticated
investors, are able to anticipate bad news from the company’s external auditor in the form of a
first-time going concern modified audit opinion (GCMO), and whether this opinion is associated
with trading after its release. External auditors obtain a vast amount of private information when
conducting the audit (Kida, 1980; Beattie, Fearnley & Brandt 2000), most of which is never
revealed to the public. However, in the case of a GCMO, the auditor is required to indicate their
overall doubt regarding the continued viability of the company, along with the salient factors that
have caused them to maintain such doubt (Carson, Ferguson & Simnett 2006; Blay & Geiger,
2013; Xu, Carson, Fargher & Jiang, 2013; AUASB, 2015; PCAOB, 2015a; Carson, Fargher &
Zhang 2017). Professional standards indicate that a GCMO is not a prediction of failure.
Nonetheless, it is a credible signal from the auditor regarding the financial condition of the
company and the auditor’s professional assessment of continued future viability that has the
potential to provide price-relevant information to the market (Fleak & Wilson, 1994; Menon &
Williams, 2010; Blay, Geiger & North, 2011; Renart & Barnes, 2013; Ianniello & Galloppo, 2015;
Carson et al., 2017). Therefore, we examine trading around announcements of first-time GCMOs
to determine whether institutional investors in the U.S. appear to anticipate this GCMO, and
whether it provides additional information to these investors.
A large literature establishes the important role that the external auditor plays in the
financial markets (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Hay, Knechel, & Willekens, 2014). Prior research has
found that an audit by independent external auditors increases the credibility of financial
information produced and disseminated by company management (Duréndez & Gómez3

Guillamón, 2003; Wallace, 2004; Fan & Wong, 2005), which then enables companies to reduce
their overall cost of capital (Minnis, 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2011). In addition, prior research
finds that specific communications from external auditors directly affect both a company’s cost of
capital (Ogneva, Subramanyam, & Raghunandan, 2007; Karjalainen, 2011), and their equity price
(Fleak & Wilson, 1994; Blay & Geiger, 2001; Menon & Williams, 2010; Ianniello & Gallopo,
2015; Kausar, Taffler & Tan, 2017).
Standard-setters in the U.S., and internationally, have for the past several years debated,
proposed and adopted regulations pertaining to reporting on a company’s ability to continue as a
going concern from both management’s perspective and the auditor’s perspective (IAASB 2015).
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the U.S. recently adopted new reporting
standards for company management to affirm their company’s ability to continue as a going
concern, or to disclose the significant reasons the company’s going-concern status may be at risk
(FASB 2014). Further, and along with recently finalizing a new overall auditor reporting standard
(PCAOB 2017a), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has held numerous
meetings with their advisory boards discussing how auditors should assess and report on going
concern issues of their audit clients (PCAOB 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). These
discussions have led to placing the issue of auditor reporting on going concern on the PCAOB’s
current project agenda (PCAOB 2017b).
Prior literature also establishes the important role that institutional investors play in the
financial markets. Previous research has found that these sophisticated investors not only are able
to profitably trade on publicly available information (Bushee & Goodman, 2007; Yan & Zhang,
2009; Jegadeesh & Tang, 2010), their trades also provide information to the market that influences
individual firm valuation (Sias & Starks, 1997; Boehmer & Kelley, 2009; Ramalingegowda & Yu,
4

2012). Institutional investors often have access to private information in the form of meetings with
corporate executives that are not available to other market participants (Ke & Ramalingegowda,
2005; Griffin, Shu & Topaloglu, 2012; Green, Jame, Markov & Subasi, 2014). Accordingly, prior
studies (Ke & Petroni, 2004; Solomon & Soltes, 2015) observe that institutional investors are able
to execute profitable trades based on their private information, and that there is a positive
relationship between changes in institutional holdings and firms’ future earnings and returns.
Consequently, institutional investors appear to be able to anticipate future corporate events better
than other market participants (Ke & Petroni, 2004; Hribar, Jenkins & Wang, 2009;
Ramalingegowda, 2014).
We analyze institutional investor trading activity by using a proprietary database of U.S.
institutional investor trades from Ancerno Ltd. We examine trading activity before and after the
announcement of a first-time GCMO and focus our analysis on the net buying activity (i.e.,
purchases minus sales) of these institutional investors. If institutions are able to accurately
anticipate the receipt of a first-time GCMO, we expect to see a pattern of net selling prior to the
announcement of the first-time GCMOs. Further, our analysis employing actual daily trading
activity allows us to determine, on average, how early institutional investors begin to actively trade
on their expectation of a GCMO.
We find that Ancerno investors are abnormal net sellers beginning approximately six
months prior to the announcement of the first-time GCMO and remain so through three months
after release of the GCMO. Our results are generally consistent with Johnson and Lys (1990) who
show that fundamental changes in a firm's operations can precede a GCM, thereby inducing
knowledgeable institutional investors to sell. Our findings support Ramalingegowda (2014) who
finds that institutional investors are net sellers prior to bankruptcy filing. Our results are also
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consistent with those of Menon and Williams (2010) who find that institutional investor ownership
percentages are significantly lower the quarter after the GCMO announcement. Further, we find
that, in general, the severity of the GCMO, as indicated by multiple stated reasons for the report
modification, do not significantly affect institutional investor net selling activity prior to the
GCMO date, but are associated with greater net selling activity after its release. These results
suggest that institutional investors are generally able to identify and reduce their holdings of
subsequent first-time GCMO firms, yet the reasons for the GCMO are still value-relevant and
significantly affect even sophisticated institutional investor trading.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study differs from prior
research in that we address a more fundamental question of whether institutional investors appear
to be able to anticipate forthcoming first-time GCMOs prior to their public announcement; and if
so, when the institutional investors first start trading on the anticipated GCMOs. Prior studies have
investigated institutional investor trading around the release of information from the company or
from investment analysts, but not from the company’s external auditor. We demonstrate that
institutional investors appear able to accurately anticipate auditor GCMOs, even after controlling
for other indicators of financial stress, and are net sellers of these companies prior to the public
GCMO announcement. Second, we use actual institutional investor daily trading data. Prior
research investigating investor reaction to price-relevant information has typically examined the
aggregate equity market, or has relied on quarterly 13-F institutional investor holdings data to infer
trading reaction of institutional investors (Menon & Williams, 2010). 1 Third, ours is one of the
few studies that explore reaction to the reasons auditors indicate in the GCMO for their doubt
about a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern (Menon & Williams, 2010; Chen, He, Ma &
Stice, 2016). We find that institutional investor trading differs with the severity of reasons for the
6

GCMO, but only after the GCMO is released, suggesting that the wording of the GCMO matters.
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on differences in Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms as we find
evidence that Big 4 audit opinions are associated with significantly greater net selling, suggesting
Big 4 opinions may be viewed as more credible than non-Big 4 opinions. Lastly, we contribute to
the sparse literature on institutional investor trading of distressed firms. Frino, Jones, Lepone, and
Wong (2014) and Ramalingegowda (2014) examine trading on bankrupt firms in Australia and in
the U.S., and Ramalingegowda (2014) notes that there are numerous studies on the trading
behavior of institutional investors, yet there is little research that investigates institutional investor
trading on financially distressed firms. As investor trading and auditor reporting on distressed
firms is of interest to regulators, practitioners and academics (Carson et al., 2017; Kausar &
Lennox, 2017), we extend the literature in this area by examining trading surrounding distressed
firms that receive first-time GCMOs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some
background, discusses the prior literature and presents our research questions. A discussion of our
institutional investor trading data is presented next, followed by our research method. We then
present the results of our analyses, and the final section concludes the study.

2. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
2.1 Auditor Going Concern Opinions and Market Responses
External auditors, as third party information intermediaries, play a key role in shaping a
company’s information environment and enhancing the credibility of disclosed financial
information (Duréndez Gómez-Guillamón, 2003; Wallace, 2004). In performing this role, external
auditors obtain a tremendous amount of private company information that they use in conducting
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the audit and in formulating their professional opinion regarding the company’s financial
statements and disclosures (Kida, 1980; Beattie et al., 2000; PCAOB, 2015a). Professional
standards preclude auditors from disclosing or acting on their private information; however,
auditors convey some of their private information by rendering their professional opinion on the
client’s financial statements in their audit report. The audit report is the final, public summation of
the auditor’s professional opinion regarding the client company’s financial statements and
disclosures. The release of this opinion from a privately informed third party may relay new or
confirmatory information to the market (Blay et al., 2011), and although guided by professional
standards, its form and content is controlled by the auditor.
Current going concern reporting standards in the U.S. are consistent with those of the
IAASB (2015) and AUASB (2015). They require that in cases of company financial stress, if, after
evaluating all the available evidence, the auditor has “substantial doubt” regarding whether the
client company can continue as a going concern for the succeeding 12 months, then they are
required to modify their audit report to emphasize this uncertainty (PCAOB, 2015b). The issuance
of an audit opinion modified for going concern uncertainty involves evaluating a voluminous
amount of audit evidence, and requires a considerable amount of professional judgment (Kida,
1980; Carson et al., 2013; Renart & Barnes, 2013).
Prior empirical and anecdotal research finds that GCMOs, and especially first-time
GCMOs, are likely the outcome of an extensive amount of negotiation between company
management and the auditor (Kida, 1980; Beattie et al., 2000; Bodek, Daugherty, & Radtke, 2012).
During these negotiations, auditors must balance client preferences for unmodified reports against
their fiduciary duty to act in the interest of financial market constituents. Prior research has
supported this reporting tension on the part of external auditors by documenting that clients do not
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welcome getting a GCMO opinion from their auditor, and often dismiss the audit firm if they
receive what can be viewed as an unwarranted GCMO opinion (Geiger, Raghunandan, & Rama,
1998; Carcello & Neal, 2003). However, in cases of bankruptcy, auditors are able to reduce their
litigation exposure if they issue a GCMO to a financially distressed client prior to bankruptcy filing
(Kaplan & Williams, 2012). These findings support an audit client’s preference for a standard
unmodified audit report, and the potential adverse consequences for auditors issuing and not
issuing a GCMO. Accordingly, auditors are very cognizant about not rendering a warranted
GCMO, or rendering one without justification (Geiger, Raghunandan & Rama 1998).
Prior research also documents that an auditor’s GCMO opinion is perceived by the market
as a credible signal of the company’s business risk (Dopuch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1986;
Kennedy & Shaw, 1991). In general, companies that are recipients of unexpected first-time GCMO
reports experience a statistically and economically significant negative stock price reaction (Fleak
& Wilson, 1994; Blay & Geiger, 2001) that causes a shift in firm valuation from the income
statement to the balance sheet (Blay et al., 2011). In sum, prior research supports the position that
the GCMO opinion provides incremental information to the market from the auditor that is
generally interpreted as a signal of potential business failure (Hopwood, McKeown, & Mutchler,
1994; Carson et al., 2013; Ianniello & Gallopo, 2015).
Menon and Williams (2010), using institutional holdings data from quarterly 13F filings,
show that institutional ownership declines after the issuance of first-time GCMOs and that market
reaction to the GCMO announcement is negatively related to level of institutional ownership. They
conclude that institutional investors facilitate the market’s ability to evaluate the negative
information provided by the auditor’s GCMO, and that institutional investors are the primary
drivers of the negative stock price reaction to a GCMO.
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22. Institutional Investors as Sophisticated Market Participants
Institutional investors own more than 60 percent of all publicly traded stocks in the US,
and account for an even greater proportion of trading volume, making them one of the most
important participants in the equity market. 2 Institutional investors are endowed with resources
that can be used to obtain or generate superior information through either their own research or
their connections with analysts, investment bankers, corporate executives, and board members.
Institutional investors also have the ability to hire professional fund managers and analysts to
perform extensive data collection and analysis of publicly available company information, which
also enables them to outperform the general public (Sias & Starks, 1997; Boehmer & Kelley,
2009). 3
In addition, large institutional investors are often able to access material information
through different channels, while small investors must generally rely solely on publicly available
information (Jegadeesh & Tang, 2010; Bushee, Jung, & Miller, 2011; Griffin et al., 2012; Green
et al., 2014). For example, a 2015 Wall Street Journal article reports that institutional investors get
special access to companies and are not only given company facts, they are afforded the
opportunity to read executives’ body language and voice tone for subtle, unspoken clues during
restricted meetings with top management. 4 In sum, the above arguments suggest institutional
investors, in general, possess an informational advantage over other investors.
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the preceding discussion, and the negative share price impact of a first-time
GCMO, if institutional investors are able to anticipate these events for a company held in their
investment portfolio, we expect them to be net sellers of those company shares prior to the public
announcement of a first-time GCMO. Therefore, we expect institutional investors to start actively
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selling their stocks in firms receiving a first-time GCMO before the public announcement.
Accordingly, our first research question is:
RQ1: Are institutional investors net sellers prior to public announcements of a first-time
going-concern modified audit report?
Our study differs from prior studies on institutional investor holdings in that we address a
more fundamental question of whether institutional investors appear to be able to anticipate
forthcoming first-time GCMARs prior to their public announcement; and if so, when the
institutional investors first start trading on the anticipated GCMARs
3.1 Institutional Investor Trading and the Severity of the GCMO
GCMOs are not identical because professional auditing standards require that if the auditor
determines that there is substantial doubt about the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern,
that the auditor must mention the pertinent conditions and events giving rise to such doubt in their
audit report (PCAOB, 2015a). However, only a few studies have examined the reasons for the
auditor rendering a GCMO and the varying influence on report users. In one of the first studies,
Menon and Williams (2010) find that GCMOs indicating the company is having difficulty
obtaining financing, which they classify as a severe reason for a GCMO, experience greater
negative stock price reaction than GCMOs for other reasons. Chen et al. (2016) provide evidence
that different reasons for the GCMO (for example financing difficulties, operating difficulties,
other) lead to different loan contract conditions (for example interest rate, maturity, number and
type of loan covenants). These studies highlight the informative value of the different GCMO
reasons, and provide empirical support that what auditors communicate in the GCMO is not a
simple binary decision to modify or not modify their report.
If institutional investors are better able to anticipate the receipt of a first-time GCMO than
other market participants, then it follows that they may also be able to more accurately identify the
11

reasons for the GCMO, and the severity of those reasons. Accordingly, we examine whether the
severity of the reason for the GCMO is associated with institutional investor trading behavior.
Thus, our second research question:
RQ2: Is institutional investor net selling greater for more severe reasons for a first-time
going-concern modified audit report than less severe reasons?

4. DATA AND SAMPLE
Following prior research (Blay & Geiger, 2001; Menon & Williams, 2010), we classify a
firm as receiving first-time GCMO if it receives a GCMO in the current year, but did not get a
GCMO in the previous year. We combine Compustat and Audit Analytics databases with the
institutional investors’ detailed trading data provided by Ancerno Ltd. to investigate the
institutional investors trading behaviors around the release date of the GCMOs. Puckett and Yan
(2011) conclude that the institutional investors in the Ancerno Ltd. dataset account for around 10
percent of institutional trading activity. 5 The sample for this study consists of firms receiving a
GCMO from the period 2002 to 2010. 6
To examine trading activity, we use the daily trade data and form monthly institutional
investors’ trading metrics (i.e., net buying). The database does not provide the name of the
institutional investors, however, each institution has a unique investor code and Ancerno reports
traded firm identifiers (CUSIP and TICKER symbol), trade date, execution volume, execution
price, and whether the trade is a buy or sell (see Cready et al, 2014). We only include firms with
trading data from Ancerno that also have stock price, earnings before extraordinary items, market
value of equity, book value of equity and total assets data in Compustat. We drop small firms
(firms with less than $10 million in market value of equity). We also exclude 26 firms whose
GCMO filing dates from Audit Analytics precede the fourth quarter earnings announcement date
from Compustat. After merging Audit Analytics, Compustat, and Ancerno databases our sample
12

consists of 420 firms receiving first-time GCMOs. We use the reasons for report modification in
Audit Analytics to identify companies with severe GCMOs.

5. RESEARCH DESIGN
The metric representing institutional investor trading activity is constructed in two steps.
First, we compute the daily net buying activities of the investors for each GCMO firm on each
day. In particular, the institutional investors’ net buying metric for firm i on day t (NET_BUYit) is
constructed as:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

where BUYit (SELLit) represents total number of shares outstanding purchased (sold) by the
Ancerno investors in firm i on day t. Therefore, NET_BUYit expresses the difference between
percent buying activity and percent selling activity in firm i on day t. Second, after computing
the daily percentage net buying activities we form monthly averages of the daily net buying
activities during the months surrounding the GCMO filing date. Thus, NET_BUYi,m represents
institutional investors’ average percentage net buying activity of firm i in month m. The monthly
net buying metric is constructed as:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 /T

(2)

where T represents the number of trading days in month m. For example, NET_BUYi,-2
(NET_BUYi,+2) is the average percentage net buying activity of Ancerno investors in firm i during
the 2nd month prior to (after) the GCMO filing date. We examine monthly net buying activities of
the investors for a window of 15 months; nine months before to six months after around the GCMO
filing date (i.e., from month-9 through month+6). The use of a 15-month window also ensures that
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the investigation period of a first-time GCMO does not coincide with the investigation period of
another first-time GCMO issued to the same company. 7
As discussed further in a subsequent section of the paper, we first conduct a univariate
analysis for the months surrounding the GCMO filing date (i.e., from month-9 through month+6).
Sample demographic statistics for the first-time GCMO firms are presented in Table 1. As is
observed in Panel A of Table 1, the sophisticated investors are, on average, net sellers in the
GCMO firms during the 15-month period with a mean NET_BUY of -0.063. Additionally, Panel
A of Table 2 presents the monthly net buying activities during the months surrounding the GCMO.
We observe that the institutions are neither significant net sellers nor net buyers for the first-time
GCMO firms from month-9 to month-7, inclusive. In other words, the Ancerno investors do not
significantly prefer buying or selling during these three months, which provides us a unique
research design opportunity in which this “silent” trading period can be employed as a benchmark
period in our examination of trading behavior. In essence, this “silent” trading period allows the
GCMO firms to provide their own control for comparing future trading activity. 8
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
We then use OLS regressions to answer our research questions related to the trading
activities of institutional investors around first-time GCMOs. In our regression model we provide
additional control for several factors that potentially explain investor trading reaction to GCMOs
and estimate the following model:
NET_BUYi,m=α0+ ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 Ƭ𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 +∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 +α1SIZEi+α2BTMi+α3EARNINGSi+
α4BIG4i+α5ZSCOREi + ε

(3)

where:

14

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 is a dummy variable equal to one if the designated trading month represents the

mth month prior to the GCMO filing date; 0 otherwise,

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 is a dummy variable equal to one if the designated trading month represents the

mth month after the GCMO filing date; 0 otherwise,

SIZEi is the market value of equity of firm i at the end of the fiscal year of the GCMO,
BTMi is the book-to-market measured as book value of equity scaled by the market value
of equity of firm i at the end of the fiscal year of the GCMO,
EARNINGSi is the annual earnings surprise measured as annual earnings before
extraordinary items from the fiscal year of the GCMO minus last year’s annual earnings before
extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity from last year,
BIG4i is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was audited by a Big 4 audit firm; 0
otherwise, and
ZSCOREi is an overall measure of firm distress presented in Zmijewski (1984) calculated
using the most recent fiscal year prior to our investigation window, and where higher scores
indicate higher levels of financial stress.
Following prior research, we include controls for firm size (SIZEi) and the market’s
perceived growth opportunities for the firm (BTMi). We expect SIZE to be positively associated
and BTM to be negatively associated with trading activity (Ramalingegowda 2014). We also
include control for earnings surprises (EARNINGSi) to address concerns raised by Myers,
Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017) regarding the market’s reaction to the earnings surprise
and not the GCMO. We expect to observe a positive association between the surprise and the net
15

buying activity by institutions. We control for audit reporting quality and information source
credibility by including a Big 4 indicator variable (BIG4i), and expect it to be negatively associated
with net selling activity. Finally, we also control for the overall level of financial stress (ZSCORE)
to help insure that investors are trading in relation to the GCMO and not the firm’s overall financial
condition. We expect that higher levels of financial stress lead to greater net selling.
In addition, notice that the data employed in estimating model (3) also include observations
from the monthly net buying activities (NET_BUYi,m) from month-9 to month-7, the benchmark
period. Therefore, regression coefficients on the dummy variables (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 or 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 ) represent
the relative magnitude of the net buying activity by the Ancerno investors during the mth month
compared to the benchmark period. A significantly negative coefficient on the monthly indicator
variables suggests that institutions’ net selling activity in the mth month prior to (or after) the filing
date is significantly greater than in the month-9 to month-7 benchmark period.
We investigate whether institutional investor net selling activity is greater for more severe
reasons for a first-time GCMO, RQ2, by employing the following model:
NET_BUYi,m=α0+ ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 Ƭ𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚

+∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + α1SIZEi+α2BTMi + α3EARNINGSi+ α4ZSCOREi +
α5BIG4i + ε

(4)

where SEVEREi is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i receives a first-time severe GCMO; 0
otherwise. We first follow Menon and Williams (2010) and classify the reasons stated in the
GCMO as either: 1) financing problems, 2) poor financial performance, 3) operating problems,
and 4) other issues. We then adopt a stricter definition of severe than Menon and Williams (2010)
who used only the presence of financing problems to signal severe GCMOs, and identify a first16

time GCMO as severe if the opinion mentions both a financing problem and a financial
performance difficulty (for example recurring losses, or retained earnings deficit). Using this
definition, we identify 154 of the 420 first-time GCMOs as severe. We expect a significantly
negative coefficient on the interaction term PREi,mxSEVEREi (POSTi,mxSEVEREi) which indicate
that institutions’ net selling activity in the mth month prior to (after) the filing date is higher for the
firms receiving a severe first-time GCMO than those receiving an other than severe GCMO.
6. RESULTS
As reported in Panel A of Table 1, our sample of 420 first-time GCMO firms have mean
assets of $1,088 million and mean market value of equity (SIZE) of $137 million over the years
2002-2010. Again, the institutional investors in our study are, on average, net sellers of these
GCMO firms over the 15 months surrounding the GCMO announcement as reflected in the mean
NET_BUY of -0.063. In other words, the percent selling activity exceeds the percent buying
activity by 6.3percent for the period (p-value<0.01). The GCMO firms also report mean book-tomarket ratios (BTM) of -0.845, mean share prices of $3.145 and earnings surprises (EARNINGS)
of -0.049. All mean values in Panel A are significantly different than zero at p-value<.01, except
the average BTM is not significantly different from zero (p-value=0.29).
6.1 Univariate Tests
Table 2 reports the mean values for NET_BUY monthly trading activity of our sample of
institutional investors holding portfolios containing firms that receive a first-time GCMO. As
reported in Panel A of Table 2, the institutional investors appear to anticipate the first-time GCMO
and are net sellers fully six months prior to the announcement of a first-time GCMO. Beginning
at month-6 and continuing through month+3, we find that NET_BUY is negative and significant
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(p-values range from 0.001 to 0.020), consistent with institutional investors anticipating the firsttime GCMO and executing additional net selling of equity positions in these firms well before a
GCMO announcement to the market. These results are consistent with prior research that has found
institutional investors are able to transact on their anticipation of firm-specific price-relevant
information prior to other market participants (Ke & Ramalingegowda, 2005; Green et al., 2014;
Solomon & Soltes, 2015).

To address RQ2 regarding institutional investor net selling behavior for severe GCMOs,
Panel B of Table 2 presents the monthly NET_BUY mean values for the 154 severe GCMO firms.
The severe GCMO net trading results are very similar to the full sample results, except for a nonsignificant trading activity at month-5 for the severe firms. In addition, compared to the full sample,
the trading activity in each of the months between month-6 and month+3, except for month-5, for
the severe firms are all considerably larger, indicating greater net selling of the severe firms
compared to all firms by the Ancerno investors. Accordingly, we find some univariate evidence
that, in general, institutional investors trade differently for more severe first-time GCMOs than
non-severe first-time GCMOs.
6.2 Multivariate Tests
To examine RQ1, we follow prior research and control for other factors associated with
firm stress and trading activity and estimate the coefficients in equation (3). The results of
estimating equation (3) for the full sample of first-time GCMO recipients are presented in Table
3. After controlling for measures of firm distress and other trade related factors, the coefficient
estimates in column 3 present a very similar pattern as reported in Table 2. With the exception of
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the coefficient on month-5 (PRE5), the coefficient estimates for the six months prior to and three
months subsequent to the release of the first-time GCMO are negative and significant at a pvalue<.10 or better. In addition, we find that institutional investors become net buyers in month+5
after the public announcement of the GCMO. 9 Thus, after controlling for other firm distress and
trade related factors, we continue to find strong evidence that institutional investors are net sellers
of first-time GCMO firms beginning six months prior to the GCMO.
Insert Table 3 Here
We find that our control variables are in the expected directions and are generally
significant (p-values<.10) in Table 3. It is also interesting to note that the coefficient on BIG4 is
negative and significant (p-value<.001), indicating that institutional investors are greater net
sellers of first-time GCMO firms if those firms are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. This finding
suggests that institutional investors may perceive the GCMO from a Big 4 firm as more credible
than that of a non-Big 4 firm and consequently increase their net selling accordingly. 10
We examine RQ2 with respect to differential trading around severe GCMOs by estimating
equation (4) that includes monthly indicator variables and the indicator variable for severe GCMOs
(SEVERE) that is interacted with our monthly indicator variables. Our interaction terms capture
the incremental trading activity on the severe first-time GCMO firms compared to the non-severe
first-time GCMO firms. We report our results of estimating equation (4) in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 Here
For brevity, we report the coefficients from equation (4) for the interaction terms and the
control variables. As reported in Table 4, after controlling for other trade related factors, we do not
find the same pattern for incremental institutional trades associated with more severe GCMOs
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compared to non-severe GCMOs. In fact, while most of the coefficients on our PRE*SEVERE
(POST*SEVERE) interaction terms are negative, indicating greater net selling of the severe GCMO
firms compared to the non-severe firms, they are only significant after the release of the GCMO
in month+1 and month+2. These results suggest that institutional investors trade firms receiving a
severe GCMO fairly similar to non-severe first-time GCMO firms in the periods prior to the audit
report and in the period after month+2. However, in the period immediately following the audit
report release, we find significant incremental net selling activity for the severe GCMO firms
compared to the non-severe GCMO firms. These findings provide evidence that the auditor’s
stated reasons for the GCMO have information value to these investors. The institutional investors
in our study increased their net selling activity for severe GCMO firms, but only after the release
of the GCMO mentioning the severe reasons. This post-GCMO trading pattern is particularly
salient in light of the non-significant trading differences in the immediate pre-release period. Thus,
our results suggest an informational value for the auditor’s reasons for the GCMO that are beyond
just the report modification itself.
Insert Table 4 Here
6.3 Additional and Robustness Tests
Use of a Control Sample
As with all research on firms receiving GCMOs, identifying proper counter factual
observations (i.e., companies that “should have” received a GCMO but did not) for comparison is
difficult, if not impossible (Myers et al., 2017). Nonetheless, to provide an external comparison
for assessing trading of our first-time GCMO firms (as opposed to using trading in month-9 to
month-7 as the benchmark), we identify a control sample of financially distressed firms that did
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not receive any GCMO during our entire 2002-2010 sample period. Following prior research (Blay
& Geiger, 2013), firms were considered financially distressed only if they reported both negative
income and negative cash flows in the same fiscal year. Using this definition of financial distress,
we are able to identify 438 firm-year observations on which the Ancerno investors engage in
trading. Descriptive statistics for these distressed non-GCMO firms are provided in Panel B of
Table 1, and suggest that they are very similar to the GCMO firms. To include these distressed
non-GCMO firms and address our research questions, we re-estimate models (3) and (4) by
incorporating the control sample. Specifically, we re-address RQ1 by using the following model: 11
NET_BUYi,m=α0+ ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 Ƭ𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 +

∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + α1SIZEi + α2BTMi + α3EARNINGSi + α4ZSCOREi + α5BIG4i + ε (5)

where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i received a first-time GCMO; 0 if it belongs
to the control sample of distressed non-GCMO firms. A significantly negative coefficient on the

interaction term PREi,mxFGCi (POSTi,mxFGCi) suggests that institutions’ net selling activity in the
mth month prior to (after) the filing date is higher for the firms receiving a first-time GCMO than
the distressed control sample firms. Similarly, we reinvestigate RQ2 by employing the following
model:
NET_BUYi,m=α0+ ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 Ƭ𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + ∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 +

∑6𝑚𝑚=1 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + α1SIZEi + α2BTMi + α3EARNINGSi + α4ZSCOREi + α5BIG4i

+ε

(6)

When estimating equation (6) we only include the severe first-time GCMO firms and our
control group of distressed non-GCMO firms. Therefore, a significant negative coefficient on the
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interaction term PREi,mxSEVEREi (POSTi,mxSEVEREi) suggests that institutions’ net selling
activity in the mth month prior to (after) the GCMO filing date is higher for the firms receiving a
first-time severe GCMO than the control sample firms. 12 Results of estimating models (5) and (6)
on our combined samples of distressed non-GCMO firms and all first-time GCMOs and severe
first-time GCMOs, respectively, are presented in Panels A and B of Table 5.
Insert Table 5 Here
Results of estimating equation (5) are presented in Panel A of Table 5 and indicate that,
compared to the distressed non-GCMO firms, the institutional investors are greater net sellers of
the first-time GCMO firms beginning with month-2 and continuing through month+3. These
results suggest that, after controlling for financial distress and trade related factors, the institutional
investors are still significantly greater net sellers of the first-time GCMO firms compared to
distressed non-GCMO firms beginning two months prior to the GCMO announcement and lasting
through three months after the announcement. The results in Panel B for estimating equation (6)
for the severe GCMOs are similar, and, as expected somewhat stronger, compared to the full
sample of GCMO firms. Compared to the distressed non-GCMO firms, we find significantly
greater net selling of the severe GCMOs beginning in month-4 and continuing through month+3.
These combined control-sample results lend support that our trading results are not solely
attributable to institutional investor trading on distressed firms, in that net selling is significantly
greater for firms receiving a first-time GCMO from their auditor than that for distressed nonGCMO firms.
Continuing GCMOs
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To determine that our trading results are in anticipation of a first-time GCMO and not any
GCMO, we identify 228 firm-years, with all necessary data, where the auditor renders a GCMO
in the current year, after also rendering one in the prior year (i.e., a “continuing” GCMO). When
we compare trading during month-9 thru month+6 for the first-time GCMO firms to the continuing
GCMO firms, untabulated, we find significant differences in the patterns and levels of net selling.
Specifically, compared to the continuing GCMO firms, net selling on first-time GCMO firms
begins significantly earlier (month-6 compared to month-1 for the continuing GCMO firms), and
the magnitude of the net selling behavior is typically at least two to three times greater for the firsttime GCMO firms. We further analyze differences between these two groups by adding a firsttime GCMO (FGC) indicator variable to model (3) that is interacted with each of the monthly
indicator variables. We then re-estimate the expanded model using the combined sample of firsttime and continuing GCMO firms. Results of this regression, untabulated, indicate that the firsttime GCMO firms have significantly greater net selling (i.e., negative coefficients on the
Month*FGC interaction terms) in each month beginning with month-6 and continuing through
month+3 (p-values at <.10 or less). These results provide evidence that our results appear driven
by the anticipation of and reaction to a first-time GCMO and not a continuing GCMO.
Time Period Influences
Prior research has indicated that auditor GCMO decisions may be different across our
examination period, which could then influence the way institutional investors anticipate and trade
surrounding a first-time GCMO. Specifically, prior research finds that GCMOs are less frequent
beginning on or after 2006, compared to the earlier immediate post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period
(Fargher & Jiang, 2008; Feldmann & Read, 2010; Kaplan & Williams, 2012; Read & Yezegel,
2016). Accordingly, we divide our sample GCMO firms into two periods, 2002 to 2006 and 2007
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to 2010, and re-estimate equation (3) separately for each period. The results of the separate
regressions are presented in Table 6 and clearly indicate that the 2002-2006 period is associated
with significantly greater institutional investor net selling activity before and after the first-time
GCMO announcement compared with that of the 2007-2010 period. Specifically, in the 2002-2006
period we find significant net selling in month-6 and then from month-2 through month+3, and
then we find the institutional investors are net buyers in month+4 and month+5. In contrast, in
the 2007-2010 period we find increased net selling only in month-4 and month-1, substantially less
than the earlier period. Our results are generally consistent with the findings of earlier GCMO
research, and indicate that institutional investor trading was stronger and more concentrated around
first-time GCMOs in the 2002-2006 period than in the more recent period. These findings suggest
that institutional investors were also more cognizant of auditor GCMO decisions, and the trading
implications of those decisions, in the period right after SOX compared to subsequent periods.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we examine trading activity to determine whether institutional investors
appear able to anticipate a GCMO prior to its public announcement, and to assess their trading
reaction to the GCMO once it is announced. We expect and find that institutional investors are
able to anticipate first-time GCMOs more accurately than other market participants in that they
are abnormal net sellers of first-time GCMO recipient firms up to six months prior to the release
of the audit report. While we find no strong evidence that the severity of the reasons mentioned
in the auditor’s report is associated with differential pre-report trading activity, we find evidence
that institutional investors increase their net selling after a firm receives a severe first-time GCMO.
Our results support the position that an auditor’s GCMO is influential in the marketplace by
documenting that institutional investors anticipate this price-relevant information, even beyond
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indicators of financial stress, and react through increased selling in the pre-announcement period.
The finding of increased net selling of firms with more severe reasons for report modifications
upon its release provides evidence of the incremental informational value of the wording in the
modified GCMO.
A limitation of our study is that we examine trades of Ancerno investors that represent only
a subset of the population of institutional investors. Accordingly, our findings may not generalize
to the population of institutional investors, or to investor types other than institutional investors.
In addition, our Ancerno trading data only goes through 2010, limiting how contemporary our
analyses can be. Yet, there have not been any significant structural market changes that lead us to
believe that the relationships found in our data have changed substantially in more recent years.
However, any newly adopted auditor report changes with respect to going concern need to be
examined empirically in the future.
Our study contributes to the literature examining reaction to the auditors going concern
report modification and to the limited work on institutional investor trading of distressed firms.
Using a proprietary database of actual trading data, our results are consistent with the argument
that institutional investors are better informed than other market participants and are able to use
that information to execute trades prior to the public release of price-relevant information about
the firm from their external auditor. In addition, we present evidence that the wording of the report
modification also provides information to these sophisticated investors. The results of our study
should be of interest to researchers, investors and regulators concerned with auditor reporting and
with institutional investor trading.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: First-time GCMO Firms
Variable
NET_BUY (15 observations for each firm)
Assets ($Millions)
Price
SIZE ($Millions)
EARNINGS
BTM
BIG4
ZSCORE

Mean
-0.063
1088
3.145
137
-0.049
-0.845
0.764
-1.526

Std Dev
0.657
3142
5.309
397
0.299
16.179
0.425
1.941

P25
-1.000
1.000
0.0818
10
-0.506
-0.052
0.000
-2.899

P75
-0.685
29.000
0.695
27
-0.176
1.124
1.000
0.170

Min
0.309
653
3.445
118
0.033
-311.896
1.000
-5.287

Max
N
1.000 6300
30267 420
72.960 420
6399 420
1.411 420
17.810 410
1.000 420
1.765 420

Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics relating to our sample of 420 firms receiving first-time going concern modified audit opinions between
January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2010. NET_BUY is the monthly net buying activity by the ANCERNO investors and measured as total dollar value of
the shares purchased minus total dollar value of shares sold scaled by total dollar value of the shares purchased plus total dollar value of shares sold in a
given month, Assets are the total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year associated with the audit report, SIZE is market value of the firm at the end
of the fiscal year associated with the audit report, PRICE is the stock price at the fiscal year associated with the audit report, BTM is the book-to-market
and measured as book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity at the fiscal year associated with the audit report, Earnings is annual earnings
surprise measured as the difference between current year annual earnings before extraordinary items and last year annual earnings before extraordinary
items scaled by the market value of equity from last year, BIG4 is a dummy variable equal to one if the external auditor is a top four auditor (EY, PWC,
Deloitte and KPMG), 0 otherwise, and ZSCORE is a measure of financial distress computed using the Zmijewski (1984) distress score metric which
includes three components: return on assets, debt to assets, and the current ratio. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.

Panel B: Control Sample
NET_BUY (12 observations for each firm)
Assets ($Millions)
Price
SIZE ($Millions)
EARNINGS
BTM
BIG4
ZSCORE

Mean
-0.031
1802
5.207
273
-0.156
1.188
0.717
-2.319

Std Dev
0.679
11883
5.788
654
0.134
2.579
0.451
2.382

P25
-0.653
86
1.890
38
-0.220
1.021
0.000
-4.888

P75
0.547
778
6.391
219
-0.051
1.811
1.000
-0.240

Min
-1.000
3
0.083
10
-0.506
-38.780
0.000
-5.158

Max
N
1.000 5256
218328 438
59.372 438
6137 438
-0.001 438
7.954 438
1.000 438
2.559 438
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Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics relating to our sample of 438 financially distressed non-GCMO control firms between January 1, 2002 and
December 31, 2010.
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Table 2
Net Buying Activity Around First-Time GCMOs
NET_BUY

Months
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
1
2
3
4
5
6

Panel A

Panel B

First-time GCMO firms (N=420)

Severe First-time GCMO firms (N=154)

Mean
-0.037
-0.011
-0.008
-0.097
-0.076
-0.090
-0.081
-0.110
-0.143
-0.113
-0.121
-0.100
-0.041
0.056
0.024

p-value
0.238
0.737
0.806
0.003
0.020
0.006
0.019
0.002
<.0001
0.001
0.000
0.002
0.163
0.052
0.355

Mean
-0.047
-0.044
-0.054
-0.114
-0.051
-0.146
-0.121
-0.120
-0.192
-0.192
-0.205
-0.162
-0.066
0.049
0.036

p-value
0.360
0.400
0.292
0.033
0.361
0.009
0.037
0.041
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.002
0.175
0.292
0.405

Table 2 presents mean net buying activities of ANCERNO investors for our sample of 420 (154) firms receiving a first-time
going concern modified audit opinion (GCMO) (severe first-time GCMO), where NET_BUY is average percent net buying
activity in firm i in month m and is measured as total shares purchased minus total shares sold scaled by total shares
purchased plus total shares sold in a given month. Severe GCMOs are those that indicate more than two issues related to
either manufacturing or operating performance issues, or difficulties obtaining financing. Means in bold significantly differ
from 0 at the 0.10 level or better based on a two-tailed conventional t-test.

35

Table 3
Monthly OLS Regressions on the Institutional Investor Reaction to First-Time GCMOs
Dependent Variable: NET_BUY
PRE6
PRE5
PRE4
PRE3
PRE2
PRE1
POST1
POST2
POST3
POST4
POST5
POST6

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

-0.078**
(-2.12)
-0.057
(-1.53)
-0.072*
(-1.90)
-0.063
(-1.62)
-0.092**
(-2.35)
-0.124***
(-3.32)
-0.095**
(-2.54)
-0.103***
(-2.73)
-0.081**
(-2.21)
-0.023
(-0.65)
0.075**
(2.20)
0.043
(1.34)

-0.078**
(-2.10)
-0.057
(-1.49)
-0.077**
(-2.03)
-0.072*
(-1.84)
-0.082**
(-2.10)
-0.118***
(-3.14)
-0.091**
(-2.44)
-0.104***
(-2.73)
-0.077**
(-2.08)
-0.020
(-0.56)
0.081**
(2.36)
0.045
(1.38)
0.022***
(6.00)
-0.010***
(-3.58)
0.014***
(3.87)

0.004
(0.05)
6300
0.020

-0.154*
(-1.67)
6150
0.031

-0.078**
(-2.11)
-0.057
(-1.49)
-0.077**
(-2.02)
-0.072*
(-1.84)
-0.082**
(-2.10)
-0.118***
(-3.14)
-0.091**
(-2.44)
-0.104***
(-2.73)
-0.077**
(-2.08)
-0.0120
(-0.56)
0.081**
(2.36)
0.045
(1.38)
0.024***
(6.24)
-0.009***
(-2.91)
0.013***
(3.54)
-0.042**
(-2.05)
0.004
(0.86)
-0.116
(-1.23)
6150
0.031

SIZE
BTM
EARNINGS
BIG4
ZSCORE
Constant
No. of Observations
Adj-R2

Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from model (3) for all first-time GCMO firms where NET_BUY is average percent net buying
activity in firm i in month m and is measured as total shares purchased minus total shares sold scaled by total shares purchased plus total
shares sold in month m. PREi,m (POSTi,m) is a dummy variable equal to one if trading month represents the mth month prior to (after) the
GCMO filing date; 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980). ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.
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Table 4
Monthly OLS Regressions on the Institutional Investor Reaction to "Severe" First-Time GCMOs
Dependent Variable: NET_BUY
PRE6xSEVERE
PRE5xSEVERE
PRE4xSEVERE
PRE3xSEVERE
PRE2xSEVERE
PRE1xSEVERE
POST1xSEVERE
POST2xSEVERE
POST3xSEVERE
POST4xSEVERE
POST5xSEVERE
POST6xSEVERE

Column 1
-0.039
(-0.59)
0.028
(0.40)
-0.100
(-1.44)
-0.075
(-1.06)
-0.028
(-0.39)
-0.091
(-1.37)
-0.136**
(-2.01)
-0.144**
(-2.15)
-0.111*
(-1.72)
-0.051
(-0.83)
-0.023
(-0.38)
0.005
(0.10)

Column 2
-0.024
(-0.37)
0.042
(0.60)
-0.104
(-1.51)
-0.050
(-0.70)
-0.013
(-0.18)
-0.089
(-1.33)
-0.132*
(-1.95)
-0.149**
(-2.21)
-0.102
(-1.55)
-0.037
(-0.60)
-0.030
(-0.50)
0.013
(0.23)
0.023***
(6.09)
-0.010***
(-3.39)
0.014***
(3.70)

0.019
(0.24)
6300
0.021

-0.144
(-1.53)
6150
0.031

SIZE
BTM
EARNINGS
BIG4
ZSCORE
Constant
No. of Observations
Adj-R2

Column 3
-0.023
(-0.35)
0.043
(0.62)
-0.103
(-1.49)
-0.049
(-0.69)
-0.012
(-0.16)
-0.088
(-1.31)
-0.131*
(-1.94)
-0.148**
(-2.19)
-0.101
(-1.53)
-0.036
(-0.59)
-0.029
(-0.48)
0.014
(0.25)
0.024***
(6.32)
-0.009***
(-2.80)
0.013***
(3.40)
-0.042**
(-2.00)
0.004
(0.73)
-0.107
(-1.12)
6150
0.032

Table 4 presents coefficients estimates from model (4) for first-time severe GCMO firms where NET_BUY is average percent
net buying activity in firm i on month m and is measured as total shares purchased minus total shares sold scaled by total
shares purchased plus total shares sold in month m. PREi,m (POSTi,m) is a dummy variable equal to one if trading month
represents the mth month prior to (after) the GCMO filing date; 0 otherwise, SEVEREi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i
receives a first-time severe GCMO; 0 otherwise. A Severe GCMO is one that indicates both issues related to financial
performance and difficulties obtaining financing. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per
White (1980). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions
are in Appendix 1.
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Table 5
Monthly OLS Regressions on Institutional Investor Reaction to First-Time GCMOs with the Control Sample
Dependent Variable: NET_BUY
Panel A

Panel B

First-Time GCMOs vs. Control Sample

Severe First-Time GCMOs vs. Control Sample

PRE6xFGC
PRE5xFGC
PRE4xFGC
PRE3xFGC
PRE2xFGC
PRE1xFGC
POST1xFGC
POST2xFGC
POST3xFGC
POST4xFGC
POST5xFGC
POST6xFGC
Controls
Constant
No. of Observations
Adj-R2

-0.024
(-0.53)
-0.041
(-0.86)
-0.057
(-1.22)
-0.068
(-1.43)
-0.144***
(-3.01)
-0.207***
(-4.54)
-0.077*
(-1.70)
-0.127***
(-2.76)
-0.118**
(-2.58)
-0.065
(-1.48)
0.037
(0.85)
-0.009
(-0.21)
Included
0.015
(0.13)
10176
0.032

PRE6xSEVERE
PRE5xSEVERE
PRE4xSEVERE
PRE3xSEVERE
PRE2xSEVERE
PRE1xSEVERE
POST1xSEVERE
POST2xSEVERE
POST3xSEVERE
POST4xSEVERE
POST5xSEVERE
POST6xSEVERE
Controls
Constant
No. of Observations
Adj-R2

-0.041
(-0.65)
-0.016
(-0.24)
-0.124*
(-1.93)
-0.100
(-1.55)
-0.154**
(-2.34)
-0.265***
(-4.33)
-0.162**
(-2.54)
-0.223***
(-3.61)
-0.184***
(-2.98)
-0.090
(-1.56)
0.017
(0.29)
-0.002
(-0.04)
Included
0.033
(0.30)
7236
0.034

Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from model (4) with the following treatment sample selections: Model (5) is all firsttime GCMO firms; Model (6) is Severe first-time GCMOs. A Severe GCMO is one that indicates both issues related to
financial performance and difficulties obtaining financing. The control sample for both models consists of the financially
distressed non-GCMO firms. NET_BUY is average percent net buying activity in firm i on month m and is measured as total
shares purchased minus total shares sold scaled by total shares purchased plus total shares sold in month m. PREi,m
(POSTi,m) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if trading month represents the mth month prior to (after) the GCMO filing date;
0 otherwise. FGC (Severe) is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i belongs to the first-time GCMO group (Severe first-time
GCMO group); 0 if it belongs to the control sample. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors
per White (1980). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variable
definitions are in Appendix 1.

38

Table 6
Monthly OLS Regressions on Institutional Investor Reaction to GCMOs by Time Period
Dependent Variable: NET_BUY
PRE6
PRE5
PRE4
PRE3
PRE2
PRE1
POST1
POST2
POST3
POST4
POST5
POST6
Controls
Constant
No. of Observations
Adj-R2

Years<=2006

Years>=2007

-0.099*
(-1.93)
-0.034
(-0.68)
0.034
(0.63)
-0.082
(-1.52)
-0.128**
(-2.29)
-0.140***
(-2.60)
-0.156***
(-2.93)
-0.166***
(-2.99)
-0.093*
(-1.73)
0.017
(0.33)
0.120**
(2.41)
0.118**
(2.56)
Included

-0.060
(-1.13)
-0.076
(-1.36)
-0.174***
(-3.25)
-0.062
(-1.13)
-0.043
(-0.78)
-0.099*
(-1.88)
-0.035
(-0.66)
-0.050
(-0.96)
-0.063
(-1.24)
-0.052
(-1.07)
0.048
(1.00)
-0.018
(-0.39)
Included

-0.247**
(-2.45)
2865
0.039

-0.022
(-0.32)
3285
0.019

Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from model (3) for all first-time GCMO firms where NET_BUY is average percent net buying
activity in firm i on month m and is measured as total shares purchased minus total shares sold scaled by total shares purchased plus
total shares sold in month m. PREi,m (POSTi,m) is a dummy variable equal to one if trading month represents the mth month prior
to (after) the GCMO filing date; 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per White
(1980). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in
Appendix 1.
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Appendix 1
Variable Definitions
NET_BUY

is the monthly net buying activity by the ANCERNO investors and measured as total
dollar value of the shares purchased minus total dollar value of shares sold scaled by
total dollar value of the shares purchased plus total dollar value of shares sold in a given
month,

ASSETS

are the total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year related to the audit report,

BIG4

is a dummy variable equal to one if the external auditor is a top four auditor (EY, PWC,
Deloitte and KPMG), 0 otherwise,

BTM

is the book-to-market and measured as book value of equity scaled by the market value
of equity at the fiscal year related to the audit report,

EARNINGS

is annual earnings surprise measured as the difference between current year annual
earnings before extraordinary items and last year annual earnings before extraordinary
items scaled by the market value of equity from last year,

POST

is a dummy variable equal to one if trading period covers the month after the audit
report filing date; 0 otherwise,

PRE

is a dummy variable equal to one if trading period covers the month prior to the audit
report filing date; 0 otherwise,

Price

is the stock price in $ at the fiscal year related to the audit report,

SEVERE

is a dummy variable equal to one if the GCMO indicates more than two issues related to
manufacturing or operating performance issues, or difficulties obtaining financing,
otherwise 0,

SIZE

is the market value of the firm at the end of the fiscal year related to the audit report,

ZSCORE

is an overall measure of firm distress presented in Zmijewski (1984) that is calculated
using the most recent fiscal year prior to our 15-month investigation window. The
distress model includes three components: return on assets, debt to assets, and the
current ratio, and where higher scores indicate higher levels of financial stress.
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Notes

1

Employing changes in quarterly holdings may not necessarily fully reveal institutional trading activity during the
months of the quarter. For example, buying 1 million shares in January and selling 1 million shares in February
results in no net change in holdings, which also suggests no trading during the quarter when in fact a material
amount of trading activity has taken place.

2

Source: Securities Industry Association Fact Book (2015).

3

Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) note that the top performing mutual fund manager in 2008 attributed his success to
focusing on companies with strong competitive positions, strong balance sheets and strong cash flows, suggesting
that his ability to process public information gives him an advantage over other investors.

4

Please see http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-some-investors-get-special-access-to-companies1443407097?mod=djemCFO_h&mg=id-wsj
5

Data representatives at Ancerno Ltd. Confirmed that investors submit all their trades to Ancerno Ltd. For
transaction cost analysis. Therefore, our sample includes all institutional investor trading data for those funds
contracting with Ancerno, Ltd.

6

Ancerno, Ltd. stopped providing individual investor codes in their released data after 2010. Therefore, our sample
goes from 2002 to 2010 and includes all institutional investor trading data available for that period.

7

We use 636 firms in the full sample (all GCMOs) regressions since BTM variable is missing in 14 observations.
We also use 412 firms while investigating the severity of first-time GCMOs in the multivariate setting.

8

As further discussed in our Additional and Robustness Tests section, we also adopt a distressed non-GCMO
control sample approach and compare trading on our first-time GCMO firms to trading on the distressed nonGCMO control sample. Results of those tests are very similar to our main analyses and all of our inferences remain
unchanged.

9

Based on our definition of a “first-time” GCMO, firms could appear in our sample more than once over our 20022010 sample period. We identify three firms that appear in our sample more than once. Eliminating observations
subsequent to the first occurrence produces results that are substantively the same as those presented in Table 3 and
all of our inferences remain unchanged.
10

An alternative reason for our audit firm size effect may be that the investors in the Ancerno, Ltd. data may be
more likely to follow large companies audited by Big 4 auditors. For example, Cready, Kumas, and Subasi (2018)
find that the number of Ancerno, Ltd. fund managers trading around earnings announcements is three to four times
larger for the tercile of the largest companies than for the tercile of the smallest companies. Accordingly, we control
for company size (SIZE) in our regression model. However, to the extent that Big 4 auditors more likely audit larger
companies (Alali, Elder, & Zhou 2018), and this is not adequately captured in our SIZE measure, our results may be
reflective of the interest of investors in large companies and not due to the Big 4 audit firms, per se.

11

In the control sample approach, we do not include the benchmark period (from month-9 to month-7) since the
control firms now serve as the benchmark comparison.
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12

Notice that such severe reasons leading to first-time GCMO are not applicable to the control firms since they do
not receive GCMOs.
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